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Saturday, 8 May 2010

Greek bailout is a small price to pay to protect us all

Only the hedge fund millionaires shorting the Greek debit would benefit from the demise of the euro
Europe's eyes are on the outcome of a knife-edge election. But it's not ours. A possibly more important one is taking place tomorrow, in North Rhine Westphalia, Germany. At stake is no less than the future of the euro, with voters in the industrial heartland of the Ruhr delivering their verdict on the extraordinary €22.4bn (£19bn) that German taxpayers are stumping up as their share of the rescue package for Greece.

A growing backlash against a country punch-drunk on debt, where, according to press reports, workers retire on average at 53, and where state pensions are 95% of average pay, means the coalition led by German chancellor Angela Merkel will no doubt suffer a bloody nose.

In Britain, foolhardy eurosceptics are gleeful. A voter backlash (they hope) will mean the bailout, although approved by the Bundestag on Friday, could fail to rescue Greece as markets guess that an under-financed package will receive no more cash from Europe's paymasters.

Cue a speculative attack on Portugal, then Spain, and then the final unravelling of the hated euro project. Oh, and we Brits can look forward to cheap Greek holidays as the plucky pound weathers the storm.

But let's be clear. A collapse of the euro, even if contained to the "Club Med" countries, will kebab our own personal finances, too. And I write as someone who has been persistently sceptical about the benefits of sterling joining the euro. The British eurosceptics salivating over the prospects of Brussels humbled and Athens punished for profligacy are not just hypocrites – our deficit is not far off Greece's – but simply shooting themselves in the foot. The only winners from a demise of the euro would be the hedge fund millionaires shorting Greek debt.

A Greek default would send shockwaves through the European banks – mostly French and German – which hold Greek bonds. It's what happens next that threatens to turn this into another Lehman – many times over.
Total foreign bank exposure to Greece, Portugal and Spain combined comes to around €1.2 trillion. European banks have lent most of this, with British banks – hardly in a position to cope with yet more write-downs – exposed almost as much as their German and French counterparts.

As their capital reserves are decimated, lending will shrink, the feeble economic recovery will go into reverse and, as the euro weakens, the hoped-for renaissance in manufacturing exports will wither away. Meanwhile, Greek workers – many of whom earn no more than €1,000 a month – will be suffering vicious pay cuts while the shipping millionaires find safe harbour in an offshore tax haven.

If we want to be isolationist about this, we should be praying that the Germans continue to bail out Greece before any of the bill ends up in our hands. And it's not as if the Germans are writing a blank cheque. What they are doing is lending money to Greece at 5%. Since the German state can borrow funds at below 4% it may, over the longer term, even make a profit.

It's a small price to pay for stability in Europe's financial system which, after all, is still centred on London.
p.collinson@guardian.co.uk 
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Friday, 7 May 2010

What Will Happen If Greece Defaults? Insights From Theory And Reality


For the last 50 years sovereign defaults only concerned developing countries. The recent predicaments of Greece have raised the spectre of a default in a high-income country. This column by Eduardo Borensztein, Regional Economic Advisor at the Southern Cone Department of the Inter-American Development Bank, and Ugo Panizza Chief of the Debt and Finance Analysis Unit in the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies of UNCTAD, and first published on VoxEU.org, argues exchange-rate depreciation has helped shrink the costs of default and spur economic recovery in past episodes. As part of the Eurozone, Greece may pay a steep cost if it were to default.

Sovereign debt is different. Private debt contracts can be enforced in court and court rulings enforced by asset seizures. By contrast, public-debt creditors:
  • Lack procedures for enforcing sovereign debt contracts – partly due to the principle of sovereign immunity.
  • Have ill-defined claims on the sovereign's assets as they cannot attach assets located within the sovereign’s borders, and typically have limited success in going after sovereign assets located abroad.
Since contracts cannot be enforced, why do sovereigns repay and why do lenders lend?

The economist's natural answer is that it must be the case that repaying is cheaper than defaulting (Dooley 2000). But what are the costs of default? In a seminal paper that kick-started the sovereign debt literature, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) focused on reputational costs and showed that, under certain conditions, the threat of permanent exclusion from financial markets is a sufficient condition for repaying. Successive work by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) emphasised the possibility of trade sanctions. Cole and Kehoe (1998) showed that positive lending can be sustained even if creditors cannot punish defaulting countries. In this class of theoretical models incentives to pay come from the fact that a default would reveal negative information about the government to other parties that are engaging in transactions with the defaulting government (for a detailed discussion, see Panizza et al. 2009).


Measuring the costs of default

In a recent paper (Borensztein and Panizza 2009), we look at four possible costs of default: loss of reputation, reductions in trade, costs to the domestic economy, and political costs.

When we look at trade costs, we add support to Rose's (2005) result that default episodes are associated with a drop in bilateral trade, but we are not able to identify the channel through which default has an effect on trade. In a companion paper (Borensztein and Panizza forthcoming), we also find a trade effect using industry-level data but, again, we find that the effect tends to be short lived and only lasts two to three years.

When we explore the effect of default on GDP growth, we find that, on average, default episodes are associated with a decrease in output growth of 2.5 percentage points in the year of the default episode.

However, we find no significant growth effect in the years that follow the default episode. In fact, quarterly data indicate that output contractions tend to precede defaults and that output starts growing after the quarter in which the default took place (Levy et al. forthcoming). This suggests that the negative effects of a default on output are likely to be driven by the anticipation of default.


Delayed defaults

While economic models often assume that policymakers have the incentive to default too early or too often, in the real world politicians and bureaucrats go to a great length to postpone what seems to be an unavoidable default. In the case of Argentina, for instance, even Wall Street bankers had to persuade the policymaking authorities to accept reality and initiate a debt restructuring (Blustein 2005).

There are two possible reasons for this reluctance. The first relates to the fact that default episodes seem to have high political costs. We find that, on average, ruling governments in countries that defaulted observed a 16 percentage point decrease in electoral support. We also look at changes in top economic officials and show that in any given tranquil year there is a 19% probability of observing a change in the finance minister, but after a default episode the probability jumps to 26%. The presence of such political costs has two implications. On the positive side, a high political cost would increase the country’s willingness to pay and hence its level of sustainable debt. On the negative side, politically costly defaults might lead to ‘‘gambles for redemption’’ and possibly amplify the eventual economic costs of default if the gamble does not pay off and results in larger economic costs.

It is also possible that policymakers postpone default to ensure that there is broad market consensus that the decision is unavoidable and not strategic. This would be in line with the model in Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) whereby ‘‘strategic’’ defaults are very costly in terms of reputation – and that is why they are almost never observed in practice – while ‘‘unavoidable’’ defaults carry limited reputation loss in the markets. Hence, choosing the lesser of the two evils, policymakers would postpone the inevitable default decision in order to avoid a higher reputational cost, even at a higher economic cost during the delay. If this interpretation is correct, a third-party institution that can sanction when countries cannot avoid a debt restructuring could play an important role in reducing the deadweight loss of default.


What about Greece?

The recent experience suggests that the economic costs of default may not be as high as it is commonly thought, and that economic recovery has often started soon after default. It is worth noting, however, that in all defaults studied in our work the economic recovery was helped by exchange-rate depreciation. Since this does not seem to be an option for countries that belong to the Eurozone (for reasons that are well explained in Eichengreen 2007), Greece may pay a steep cost if it were to default. For this reason, we hope that rescue plan launched on 2 May will work and that Greece will not belong to the sample when we update our paper on the costs of default.




References
Blustein, Paul (2005), And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina, Public Affairs, New York.
Borensztein, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza (2009), “The Costs of Sovereign Default”, IMF Staff Papers, 56:683-741.
Borensztein, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza, (2008), “Do Sovereign Defaults Hurt Exporters?”, Open Economies Review
Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989), “A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, 97:155-178.
Cole, Harold and Patrick Kehoe (1998), “Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations”, International Economic Review, 39:55-70.
Dooley, Michael (2000), “International Financial Architecture and Strategic Default: Can Financial Crises be Less Painful?”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 53:361–377.
Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz (1981), “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis”, Review of Economic Studies, 48:289-309.
Eichengreen, Barry (2007), “The euro: love it or leave it?”, VoxEU.org, 17 November.
Grossman, Herschel and John Van Huyck (1988), “Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation”, American Economic Review, 78:1088–1097.
Levy Yeyati, Eduardo and Ugo Panizza, forthcoming, “The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Default”, Journal of Development Economics.
Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2009), “The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default”, Journal of Economic Literature, 47:651-98.
Rose, Andrew (2005), “One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade”, Journal of Development Economics, 77:189-206.

This Day In Tech Events That Shaped the Wired World May 7, 1952: The Integrated Circuit … What a Concept!

first-ic

1952: British radar engineer Geoffrey Dummer introduces the concept of the integrated circuit at a tech conference in the United States. The world is about to change.

At the heart of every electronic device today — from computers to aircraft navigation systems — is a little circuit that has changed computing and ushered in the digital era, much as the steam engine helped usher in the Industrial Revolution.

The integrated circuit brings together components with different functions and puts them in a compact miniature board. The credit for the first working example eventually went to Texas Instruments engineer Jack Kilby. But Kilby was building on work done before him.

Dummer, who worked for his country’s defense ministry, first published the idea of an integrated circuit at the 1952 Symposium on Progress in Quality Electronic Components in Washington, D.C.

“With the advent of the transistor and the work in semiconductors generally, it seems now possible to envisage electronic equipment in a solid block with no connecting wires,” he told the audience at the conference, according to the Electronic Product News. ”The block may consist of layers of insulating, conducting, rectifying and amplifying materials, the electronic functions being connected directly by cutting out areas of the various layers.”

Dummer tried unsuccessfully for the next few years to build such a circuit, until the British Government turned off the funding for his project.

By then, work on the idea of the IC had moved to the United States. The challenge with creating a practical IC was that all the components in the circuit had to have no faults. Also, there couldn’t be too many wires in the interconnects for a complex circuit, or else the circuit would be slow.

Kilby found a solution in the summer of 1958. His idea was to make all the components and the chip out of the same block of semiconductor material, and layer the metal needed to connect them on top of it.

The first integrated circuit was fairly crude — it had only a transistor and other components on a slice of germanium. But it did show the potential of the IC, which continues today to get smaller and more complex.
Just a few months later, Robert Noyce, one of the co-founders of Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, solved some of the problems related to the interconnects, sharing the credit with Kilby for the practical IC.

Kilby patented the invention and won the 2000 Nobel Prize in Physics for his role in the creation of the IC.

Dummer died in February 2002 at the age of 93.

Photo: First integrated circuit by Jack Kilby at Texas Instruments in 1958.
Courtesy Texas Instruments


By Priya Ganapati Email Author 
 
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5 Things Apple Must Do to Look Less Evil


It’s appropriate that the Apple logo on the iPad is black. The Cupertino, California, company’s image is taking on some awfully sinister tones lately.

For a company that made its name fighting for the little guy, it’s a surprising reversal. In the past, Apple touted itself as the computer company for nonconformists who “Think Different.” Now the company is making moves that make it look like the Big Brother it once mocked.

First Apple tightened its iron grip on the already-stringent iPhone developer policy, requiring apps to be made with Apple-approved languages, which disturbed some coders and even children. A short while later, Apple rejected some high-profile apps based on their editorial content, raising journalists’ questions about press freedoms in the App Store. Then, police kicked down a Gizmodo editor’s door to investigate a lost iPhone prototype that Apple had reported as stolen. Even Ellen DeGeneres and Jon Stewart have mocked Apple’s heavy-handed moves.

Plenty of us love our shiny iPads, iPods, iPhones and MacBooks — state-of-the-art gadgets with undeniable allure. But it’s tough to imagine customers will stay loyal to a company whose image and actions are increasingly nefarious. We want to like the corporation we give money to, don’t we?

Here are five things Apple should do to redeem its fast-fading public image.

Publish App Store Rules

As I’ve argued before, the App Store’s biggest problem is not that there are rules, but that app creators don’t know what the rules are. As a result, people eager to participate in the App Store censor themselves, and that hurts innovation and encourages conformity. The least Apple can do is publish a list of guidelines about what types of content are allowed in the App Store. After all, Apple has had nearly two years and almost 200,000 apps to figure out what it wants in the App Store. Tell people what the rules are so they know what they’re getting into, and so they can innovate as much as possible. That would also tell us customers what we’re not getting on our iPhone OS devices.

Formalize Relationships With Publishers

Publishers are hypnotized by imaginary dollar signs when they look at the iPad as a platform that could reinvent publishing and reverse declining revenues. But after recent editorial-related app rejections, journalists are slowly waking up to our forewarning that Apple could control the press because news and magazine apps on the iPad are at the mercy of the notoriously temperamental App Store reviewers. If Apple wants to look a little less like the Chinese government, it should work with publishers to ink formal agreements regarding content to guarantee editorial freedom to respected brands.

Tweak iPhone Developer Agreement

Apple’s stated purpose of its revised iPhone developer policy is to block out meta platforms to ensure a high level of quality in the App Store. Also, from a business perspective, there is no lock-in advantage if you can get the same apps on the iPhone as you can on other competing smartphones. Fair enough, but Apple would be silly to think it can keep the mobile market all to itself, and its developer agreement comes off as a piece of literature holding developers hostage.

It’s hard to create new rules, but it’s easy to abolish existing ones. Apple should loosen up its iPhone developer agreement by snipping out a part of section 7.2, which states that any applications developed using Apple’s SDK may only be publicly distributed through the App Store. That implies that if you originally create an app with the Apple SDK, you’re not allowed to even modify it with different languages and sell it through another app store like Google’s Android market. In other words, iPhone apps belong to Apple. This rule is basically unenforceable to begin with, and Apple should just remove it, along with other similar policies.

Apologize to Jason Chen

Reasonable people can disagree over whether it was ethical for Gizmodo to purchase the lost iPhone prototype, but the police action — kicking down Jason Chen’s door to seize his computers — was overboard. It was self-evidently a clumsy move: After damaging Chen’s property, the police paused the investigation to study whether the journalists’ Shield Law protected Chen. The proper action would have been to issue a subpoena to get Chen to talk about the device first. Apple, which instigated the police action by filing a stolen property complaint, should publicly apologize to Chen (no relation to the author of this post) and reimburse him for the damages.

Get Gray Powell on Stage

When Apple accidentally leaked its PowerMac G5 a couple of years ago, Apple’s legal team forced MacRumors’ Arnold Kim to pull down his post containing the information. But a humbled Steve Jobs joked about the slip during his WWDC 2003 keynote, calling it a case of “Premature specification.” (See the video below.)

He should do a similar thing when he officially unveils Apple’s next phone, by having Gray Powell — the engineer who misplaced the next-generation iPhone prototype — make a stage appearance. Powell could walk out and hand Jobs the phone, saying “Hey Steve, I found your lost phone,” or something similar. Some comedic relief, provided by the engineer who lost the iPhone prototype in a bar, can remind us that Apple is still a company guided by a man with a sense of humor.




By Brian X. Chen
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Thursday, 6 May 2010

Stephen Hawking predicts possibility of time travel

Professor Stephen Hawking has suggested humans might one day be able to construct spaceships capable of such speeds that time on board would slow down. Such a craft could travel thousands of years into the future, reaching distant star systems within the lifetime of its crew.

“Time travel was once considered scientific heresy and I used to avoid talking about it for fear of being labelled a crank, but these days I’m not so cautious,” Hawking says in his ongoing series being broadcast on the Discovery channel.

He suggests humanity could build a giant “relativistic” spaceship, so called because it would exploit the science set out by Albert Einstein in his theories of relativity.

Einstein found that as objects accelerate through space, the rate at which time passes for them slows down. For objects such as cars and aircraft the effect is negligible, but Hawking’s spaceship would exceed 98 percent of the speed of light, when such effects would be extremely powerful.

Hawking said such a ship could theoretically reach speeds of more than 1,000 million km/h, but would have to be built on a huge scale simply to carry all the necessary fuel.

“It would take six years at full power just to reach these speeds. After the first two years it would reach half light speed and be far outside the solar system. After another two years it would be travelling at 90 percent of the speed of light,” he said.

Source:Xinhua/Agencies
“After another two years of full thrust the ship would reach full speed, 98 percent of the speed of light, and each day on the ship would be a year on Earth. At such speeds a trip to the edge of the galaxy would take just 80 years for those on board.”

However, Hawking dismisses the prospect of time travel into the past. Some scientists have suggested this could be done by exploiting wormholes, gateways linking different parts of the universe or which provide a short-cut backwards or forwards through time. Theory suggests such wormholes do exist at the quantum scale, meaning they are far smaller even than atoms, so the challenge would be to enlarge them to a human scale.

But Hawking dismisses the idea, pointing out that time travel into the past would create the “mad scientist paradox” where a researcher could travel back in time and shoot his past self, raising the question of who could have fired the shot.

“This kind of time machine would violate a fundamental rule that cause comes before effect,” said Hawking. “I believe things cannot make themselves impossible. So it won’t be possible to travel back to the past, using 
wormholes or any other method.” 
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