Share This

Sunday, 14 August 2011

Lawsuits with Tajudin Ramli, Is it time to settle?





Is it time to settle?

OPTIMISTICALLY CAUTIOUS By ERROL OH

IT was only this week that most of us found out about the efforts to settle all lawsuits between Tan Sri Tajudin Ramli and several government-linked companies (GLCs), including a few listed entities. According to Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Datuk Seri Nazri Abdul Aziz the Government had been mulling over the out-of-court settlement for the past six months. It was reported that Nazri sent a letter to the GLCs this month, informing them that the Government and the Finance Ministry had agreed to settle all civil claims against Tajudin.

However, it appears that the possibility of a “global settlement” of the suits have been floating around for longer than half a year.

Last December, the now delisted DFZ Capital Bhd uploaded on the Bursa Malaysia website a circular by Singapore-listed Esmart Holdings Ltd, which was acquiring a 75% stake in DFZ. In discussing the material litigation of Atlan Holdings Bhd (the vendor in this transaction), Esmart touched on the developments in a particular case and said: “In view of the global settlement in respect of all suits concerning Tan Sri Dato' Tajudin Ramli (TSDTR), the said matter is now fixed for mention on Jan 12, 2011.”

A similar reference “the global settlement in respect of all suits involving TSDTR” popped up in the notes to Atlan's quarterly report for the period ended November last year.

Atlan's legal entanglement with Tajudin is a legacy issue arising from its 2004 purchase of a 32% block of shares in Naluri Corp Bhd from Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd. Tajudin lost control of Naluri following the Asian financial crisis.



A more interesting bit of information surfaced in Axiata Group Bhd's quarterly report for the period ended Dec 31 last year. In providing an update on its material litigation, the company said: “The Court has requested the parties to mediate and TSTDR has proposed a global settlement for all the cases involving TSTDR. The parties have since agreed to mediate the pending disputes.”

Axiata appears to be one of the GLCs whose lawsuits with Tajudin are likely to be withdrawn following the Government's agreement with Tajudin. Khazanah Nasional Bhd is a 39% shareholder of Axiata, whose subsidiary Celcom Axiata Bhd was once among Tajudin's prime businesses.

Malaysia Airlines (MAS) is another former Tajudin asset that's now a part of the Khazanah stable. Not surprisingly, the national carrier too has legal disputes with him. However, to date, MAS has yet to say anything about the change in status of its suits involving Tajudin.

Neither has Telekom Malaysia Bhd (TM), which (along with subsidiary Telekom Enterprise Sdn Bhd and 22 others, including Danaharta and Celcom) is a defendant in a counterclaim by Tajudin, who is seeking RM13.4bil, among other things.

So why haven't Atlan, Axiata, MAS and TM made any announcements about the global settlement? Atlan and Axiata have disclosed the development in the notes to their financial statements and quarterly reports, but this is still a step away from highlighting the information.

It has been established that these companies' lawsuits involving Tajudin are indeed material litigation, and Bursa Malaysia's listing requirements include “the commencement of or the involvement in litigation and any material development arising from such litigation” among the examples of events that may require immediate disclosure.

Of course, there's room to argue that the global settlement is very much work in progress, with many details yet to be worked out. However, shouldn't the investing public be alerted when there's a proposed global settlement on the table and it may result in the conclusion of several suits with billions of ringgit at stake?

Nazri was quoted as saying there was no special deal between Tajudin, the Government and the GLCs for the parties to agree to the settlement of the suits. He added that it was up to the parties involved to decide what to do next. “It is their right if they want to proceed with their court case,” he said.

As listed companies, they are obliged to take into account the interests of minority shareholders as well. It's impossible to please every shareholder, for sure, but whatever the decision of each company, the board and the management need to be transparent and consistent, and their rationale ought to be persuasive. If a company decides to drop a lawsuit it has filed, particularly one that seeks to address big losses, it owes shareholders an explanation.

For example, an Axiata subsidiary, Rego Multi-Trades Sdn Bhd, commenced proceedings in 2005 against Aras Capital Sdn Bhd and Tajudin for amounts due to Rego pursuant to an investment agreement with Aras Capital and an indemnity letter given by Tajudin. In turn, Tajudin filed his defence and instituted a counterclaim to void and rescind the indemnity letter and claim damages. Said Axiata in annual report 2010: “The board of directors, based on legal advice received, are of the view that it has good prospects of succeeding on the claim and successfully defending the counterclaim if the same were to proceed to trial.”

Similarly, both TM and Axiata have expressed confidence that they can put up a winning defence against Tajudin's RM13.4bil counterclaim.

Perhaps it's good for everybody or at least, for most people if the Tajudin-related suits are settled out of court. If that's so, the listed companies should have no problems presenting that case to their shareholders.

Executive editor Errol Oh has just realised that we often overlook the listed companies' disclosures on material litigation.

Saturday, 13 August 2011

Who will solve MAS’ operational problems?






The deal with AirAsia reads like the rationalization of the airline industry but does little or nothing for Malaysia Airlines' operations

AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines aircrafts at Kua...Image via WikipediaWhile MAS has award-winning products and services, a competitive cost base, and only slightly below average load factors, our yields are dramatically lower than our competitors. – Idris Jala then CEO of MAS in February 2006 before turning around the badly ailing airline within a year.

AT the end of the day, the alliance between Malaysia Airlines (MAS) and AirAsia achieved via share swaps between their major shareholders does nothing by itself to improve MAS’ operations (see our cover story this issue for full details).

In fact a misguided overemphasis on MAS focusing on being a premium full service carrier (FSC) can have dire consequences on its revenue and viability as we shall explain.

What is clear from the figures in the chart is that the national airline has a severe revenue management crisis, which it must solve or perish. The yields broadly track the airline’s operational profits.

The problem with the yield and hence revenue is not the product, for MAS is rated consistently among the top airlines in the world for service.

The problem is not capacity utilisation because seats are on average filled three quarters, despite increases in capacity.

The problem is pricing. Despite a good, and even excellent, product it is not able to price it properly and this is reflected in its yield, which is the revenue per revenue passenger km flown (sen per RPK – the average amount an airline gets for flying a paying or revenue passenger one km.). Hence there are no profits but losses now.



If we look at the RPK in the chart for the first quarter of this year, it is back to what it was in the first quarter of 2006 after Datuk Seri Idris Jala joined MAS in December 2005. Idris’ quote above in February 2006 shortly after he took over is exactly applicable to MAS today, over five years later!

An examination of the chart shows that since Idris came in to MAS in December 2005, MAS had experienced a relentless increase in both RPK as well as revenue per available seat km or RASK (available seat km is a measure of capacity obtained by multiplying seats available by the kms flown and totalling them) up to end-2008.

The increase in RASK at the same time indicates that the seat factor (how much seats are filled, obtained by dividing the RPK by the ASK) or capacity utilisation was maintained at healthy levels.

Maximising revenue is a function of trying to control three key variables – capacity, capacity utilisation and fares. When any one of these increases, revenue increases if the other two at least stay where they are. The ideal is when all three increase simultaneously.

The issue is complex to say the least and is at the heart of the profitability of any airline. Costs, in contrast, are much easier to control and quantify. But in revenue management you need to have a good feel for what price you can charge without affecting capacity utilisation.

For this you need very good people who can feed the right information to some of the most complicated and complex modelling systems in airline operations. And you need to be constantly refining this because the situation changes all the time and from day to day.

Most FSCs like MAS have a basic fare to fill most of their seats. But with an average seat factor of say 75%, one quarter of the seats are empty and wasted if they are not utilised. They target these seats to be sold too, often at lower prices, because they bring in revenue at the margin almost all of which goes straight to profit because it is incremental.

Now here’s the paradox: MAS, like any other FSC, must in areas where the load factor or capacity utilisation is low compete on the back-end or economy class with the low cost carriers (LCCs). Not to do so would make it severely uncompetitive as an airline.

If the flights are likely to be full, MAS should move to higher prices and if they are not, than the airline has to offer discounts – sometimes considerable discounts – to fill up the seats and improve capacity utilisation. The conditions for these seats are like for LCCs – inflexible schedules and early bookings but low price.

The trick is to do this without actually cannibalising your current base customers who are willing to pay a premium for flexibility and full service and to charge a rate the market can bear for the front end – business and first class where demand is not that price sensitive.

Now, lets look at the chart again. MAS’ yields increased steadily and peaked in the fourth quarter of 2008 for a gain of 60% in just three years and exceeding even that of Singapore Airlines, indicating excellent revenue management.

It took a massive dip in 2009 along with other airlines in the aftermath of the global financial crisis which started in the last quarter of 2008. Most airlines recovered after that but MAS did not. Idris left in the third quarter of 2009 to head the Performance Management and Delivery Unit and become a Cabinet minister.

Singapore Airline’s yield in 2009 fell to 25.7 sen per RPK from 31.3 sen per RPK (at current exchange rates), down 18% and MAS’ fell from 32.9 sen per RPK to 23.4 sen by the fourth quarter of 2009, down a massive 29%. But in the first quarter of this year, SIA’s was back up to 29.9 sen per RPK but MAS’ continued to languish at 22.7 sen, even lower than that at the height of the crisis!

The difference between SIA’s and MAS’ yield now is a massive 7.2 sen. MAS has estimated in the past that one sen in yield translates to about RM500mil in revenue a year. That means that if MAS can increase its yield to that of SIA’s – not impossible, it has done it before - that’s an extra RM3.6bil in revenue.

Since this is incremental, it means an operating profit of over RM3bil assuming MAS’ operating profit this year is likely to be less than RM600mil!

That is basically the problem at MAS – its yields have not recovered post the world financial crisis which affected airlines very badly in 2009. If MAS focuses on getting its yield back while keeping costs down, it’s back in business and in a great big way too.

MAS is an airline. The argument that ancillary services will make most of its money is false, although that income is useful. It can and must make money from the airline operations, although there will be cyclical downturns.

The guy (or gal) who will turn MAS around has to understand airline fundamentals and if he has no experience in how pricing affects revenue in the airline world, he must learn pretty fast. And he has to be pretty fixated on costs and have a good eye for market opportunities. Someone like Idris.

Back to the deal. It is good for AirAsia, some of it for good reasons and some for bad reasons. It is good because AirAsia can get routes and compete with MAS on the long, medium and short haul. But bad if the intention is to cut competition through uneconomic means.

MAS should be able and allowed to compete on economic terms with AirAsia in the same way that AirAsia can – the competition must cut both ways. That is the key to a more vibrant airline sector. If MAS can increase its revenue overall and make money by offering cheaper fares on some routes, they must be permitted – and indeed encouraged – to so.

By all means collaborate via common procurement, maintenance, training and the like to bring costs down but allow full economic competition on pricing. Don’t carve the market out rigidly but let the markets overlap on the fringes as they do in reality.

Let MAS be a full service carrier on all sectors but with the liberty to compete on pricing when the economics dictate it. Let AirAsia do its low-cost thing – which it has done so well and with so much benefit for travellers – wherever it wants to and give it access to any route it wants.

And let Firefly do what it will from Subang with no restriction, meaning it does not have to be an FSC.

Then we have the best of both worlds – the most collaboration to bring down costs with the most competition to keep efficiency up, deliver excellent service and low fares. Then we will truly recognise the three elements in this equation – the two airline groups and the customers without whom the first two don’t exist.

Managing editor P Gunasegaram would like to quote another turnaround man Lee Iacocca, the one who took Chrysler back to profits against all odds sometime back: “In the end, all business operations can be reduced to three words: people, product, and profits.”

US no longer ‘AAA’, Eurozone the next?






US no longer ‘AAA’

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

STANDARD & Poor's (S&P's) had on Aug 5 cut the US long-term credit rating by a notch to AA-plus (from AAA). This unprecedented move reflected concerns about the US's budget deficits and rising debt burden. It called the outlook “negative,” indicating that another downgrade is possible in the next 12-18 months.

According to S&P's, the Aug 2 debt deal which cut spending by US$2.1 trillion, didn't go far enough: “It's going to take a deal about twice the size to stabilise the debt to GDP ratio.” It also stressed what it saw as the inability of the US political establishment to commit to an adequate and credible debt reduction plan: “The effectiveness, stability & predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges.” Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings haven't followed S&P's move causing a split rating. They had earlier (on Aug 2) affirmed their AAA credit ratings for the US, while warning that downgrades were possible, grading the outlook as negative. At the same time, China's only rating agency (Dagong Global Credit Rating) downgraded the US from A-plus to A saying the deal won't solve underlying US debt problems.

US downgrade

What does a rating downgrade mean? For the US, it will affect its borrowing costs eventually and immediately, investor opinion of US assets. According to Sifma (a US securities industry trade group), the downgrade could add up to 0.7 of 1 percentage point to US Treasury yields, thereby increasing funding costs for US public debt by some US$100bil. But the US dollar has a special position as the numeraire of global transactions; it is also a reserve currency, and often regarded as a safe haven in times of uncertainty. Ironically, in the recent sell-off in equities world-wide following the S&P's downgrade, US government bonds was a big beneficiary. Its benchmark 10-year bond yields fell 21 basis points on Monday to 2.35%, the biggest one day drop since January 2009; by Wednesday, it was 2.14%, the lowest yield on record. Two year US Treasuries yield touched a record low of 0.23% and then, fell further to 0.184% on Wednesday. In the panic, Treasuries appear to be still the way to go.

With the downgrade, US no longer warrant the top-tier rating it enjoyed since 1941 (Moody has had a AAA on the US since 1917). At AA+, the US is still considered to have a “strong” ability to service its debt. Only Canada, Germany, France & UK still carry triple-A at S&P's. The downgrade didn't affect US short-term rating which remains at A-1+, the highest at S&P's. In a follow through, S&P's downgraded numerous government related enterprises (notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which together hold more than one-half of US mortgages), 73 investment funds (fixed income funds, hedge funds, etc) and 10 insurance companies for their large holdings of Treasuries. But banks were spared on the implicit “too big to fail” policy of the government. Nevertheless, the US bond market retains widespread appeal. At more than US$35 trillion at end-March, this market is broad, liquid and deep. The Treasuries market alone has US$9.3 trillion debt outstanding. But in the end, the market decides. Consider Japan S&P's downgraded it in 2002. Today, Japan is still able to borrow freely & cheaply. As of Aug 9, interest rate on Japan's 10-year bonds stood at just 1.045% and 30-years, at below 2%. In practice, for the US, a double A-plus still works like a de facto triple-A.

Market rebound: Traders work on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange on Thursday — AP
 
Immediate global sell-off

When markets opened following the weekend downgrade, a global panic sell-off in equities took over.  There was a lot of fear and uncertainty in the markets, reflecting a confluence of three main factors:

● uncertainty about the US economy faltering, raising the risk of a double-dip recession;
● worries that the downgrade could further undermine US consumer confidence & business spending adding another layer of anxiety on the global economic outlook; and
● fear the euro-zone debt crisis will spin out of control, spooking investors.

All this took its toll. Stock markets plunged around the world with funds flowing into havens, such as gold (up 60% since 2010, surpassing US$1,800 a troy ounce), Swiss francs (up 24% against euro and 32% on US dollar over the past year) and ironically, US Treasuries. In Asia, markets closed at their lowest levels in about a year. Key benchmarks in Hong Kong, Seoul, Mumbai and Sydney skidded for the fifth consecutive day. Shares in China, Taiwan and South Korea plunged sharply before recovering some ground. All closed nearly 4% lower on Monday. In Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index had its worst day since the 2008 financial crisis, falling another 5.6% on Tuesday; it had fallen by 16.7% in the past six sessions, or more than 20% from its recent peak. South Korea's Kospi was down 3.6% and Indonesia's main stock exchange fell 3%. At its close, the KL Bursa lost another 1.7% on Aug 9 (-1.8% on Aug 8). Japan's Nikkei fell 2.2% to its weakest level since the March earthquake. India's Bombay stock index declined 1.6%, its fifth drop in a row.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) recovered 1.5% on Tuesday after a record 635 point fall (-5.5%) in sell-offs on Monday. The German DAX closed further down 5% and the Paris CAC 4.7% lower while the FTSE 100 in London fell another 3.4%. The Stoxx Europe 600 index ended 1.4% higher following a 4.1% slide on Monday, although underlying sentiment remained extremely fragile. The VIX which tracks stock market volatility, reached its highest since the initial Greek debt crisis in May 2010. It rose 20% to 38.5 on Monday afternoon and then to 40.5 on Tuesday, reflecting extreme fear and emotional trading. It measures the price investors pay for protective options on the S&P's 500 index. After Monday's sharp share-price drop and the previous week's poor performance, China and Hong Kong aren't the only markets at or near bear territory. Stocks in Germany & France are now down more than 20% (definition of a bear market), from highs reached in the previous year. India's benchmark Bombay Sensex is down 20%, and Japan's Nikkei is off 16.5%.

A day after US stocks received a boost from the Fed to keep interest rates low until 2013, markets in the US and Europe resumed their plunge on Wednesday. The fear: politicians across the Atlantic won't be able to manage the significant headwinds buffeting the US & European economies. Woes were focused on France, where its bank stocks plunged amid worries it may lose its triple-A status. The Paris CAC-40 index fell 5.4%. In the US, the DJIA was down 4.62% (-520 points) wiping out Tuesday's surge. The Fed had run out of bullets. Asian stocks advanced Wednesday with sentiment helped by a strong Wall Street rebound. However, gains in most markets lacked the passion observed on the way down. Hong Kong was up 2.3%, South Korea, 0.3% and Taiwan, 3.3%. All three were still down more than 10% so far in August. Japan was up 1.1%, Australia, 2.6% and China, 0.9%. But Stoxx Europe 600 was down 3.7%. Expectations are for the markets to remain choppy. On Thursday, most Asian markets were back in negative territory. But Europe closed stronger (up about 3%) and the DJIA surged by 4% (+423 points).



European contagion 

Italy and Spain, the euro-zone's third and fourth largest economies, have a combined GDP of nearly 2.7 trillion euros, about 30% of the eurozone total. For nearly two years, the European Union (EU) has been trying to stem the unfolding debt crisis. The July 21 Greek bailout bought some time not much to ward off further contagion. The European Central Bank's (ECB) decision on Aug 7 to buy Italian and Spanish debt represents a watershed in EU's continuing battle against turning ECB into the lender of last resort. The ECB has insisted the main responsibility to act lies with national governments. Given worries of a new bout of contagion sweeping European and global markets, ECB defended the new intervention as restoring the “normal functioning of markets through a better transmission of monetary policy.” ECB's continued bond-buying brought benchmark Spanish borrowing costs for 10-year bonds down to 5.019% on Tuesday, close to their lows for the year. Italian 10-year bond yields also fell to a one month low of 5.143%. Both countries' yields had approached 6.5% last week a level that eventually escalated to push Greece, Ireland & Portugal into bail-outs. Analysts estimate ECB could have bought up to 10 billion euros, a small fraction relative to the size of Spain & Italy's debt markets. Italy's debt alone is 1.8 trillion euros.

Market sentiment aside, the purchases did little to change the fundamental backdrop in Europe where economic growth has slowed even in the “core” nations of Germany & France. Signs of stress remain despite the positive market reactions to ECB's decision. Deposits at ECB, for example, hit a 2011 high of 145 billion euros on Monday, reflecting banks' reluctance to lend inter-bank preferring the safety of ECB. There is a limit to how deeply ECB can be drawn into the fiscal misadventures of its members. Concerns are mounting on the French economy because of its high debt levels (85% of GDP, already above the US & rising) and weak growth prospects. Germany, in much better shape, isn't immune either. Already, the cost of insuring German bonds against default using credit-default swaps (CDSs) rose above 85 basis points, higher than insuring UK bonds for the first time on Tuesday, despite the London riots. There is growing concern the new austerity measures in Italy & Spain will slacken their struggling economies, plagued also by social unrest.

What's wrong with the US economy?

The recession ended two years ago. The stumbling recovery may turn out to be the worst ever. Most indicators are not reassuring unemployment at 9.1% is still too high and jobs creation too slow; GDP growth is faltering, income growth continues lagging behind; household wealth is falling; banks are not lending enough; and consumer expectations have not been positive. In the last eight recoveries, lost jobs were regained within two years of recession's end. This recovery is still seven million jobs below peak employment in 2008 and about two million fewer than if unemployment was held below 8%. The US economy will remain lacklustre for some years because of heavy household debt, a financial system deeply scared by mortgages, and a dysfunctional political establishment. Heavy household debt and a dismal job market have hurt consumers' confidence, further dampening their willingness to spend. The only bright spot is exports, reflecting the weak US dollar and still booming emerging economies. Unexpectedly, the pace of growth in US services fell in July to its lowest level since February 2010. Taken alongside disappointing manufacturing data, the services sector showed-up an economy with weak hopes of a rebound in the second half of this year, after an anaemic first half. According to Harvard's Martin Feldstein, “This economy is really balanced on the edge. There is now a 50% chance that we could slide into a new recession.” Even Prof Larry Summers now concedes: “The odds of the economy going back into recession are at least one in three.”

The US problem is more a job and growth deficit than an excessive budget deficit. The diagnosis of the run-up in debt out of control spending by the Federal government, is exaggerated. Indeed, the “cure” of severe spending cuts is likely to make recovery more difficult. The real problem lies in the fall-off in tax revenue. From 20% of GDP in 1998-2001, tax revenue has fallen steadily: averaging just 17% of GDP from 2002-08 and then, to below 15% in 2009-10. About 50% of the rise in deficit was due to the downturn because of “automatic stabilisers”, reflecting cyclical revenue falls and higher spending to assist the unemployed and other transfers to help the poor. They contribute to demand and assist to “stabilise” the economy.

The US rating downgrade is a warning bell. On present trend, its debt burden is unsustainable and the US political system seems unable to reverse it. To do so, it needs faster growth can't cut its way to growth. What's required is tax reform and a will to restore revenues back to the 20% of GDP trend; a prospect most Republicans have castigated. At issue is not the US government's capacity to service its debt, John Kay of the Financial Times pointed out. It is the “willingness of the government to repay.” If sovereign borrowers meet their obligations, it is only because “they want to.”

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching & promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

Simple way to understand US Economic Situation










Simple way to understand US Economic Situation:

Federal Budget 101 Letter - LA



Friday, 12 August 2011

How did the world get so fixated on GDP?





GDP growth remains central to economic policy, yet life in flatlining Japan remains rather better than it does elsewhere

By James Meadway guardian.co.uk,
Pacific island of Nauru
Mining on the Pacific island of Nauru shows how 'a few years of apparent prosperity can be bought at immense future cost'. Photograph: Torsten Blackwood/AFP/Getty Images

The economic news grows daily more grim. Across the developed world, once-optimistic forecasts for growth are being revised downwards. Financial markets, sensing trouble ahead, are in a tailspin. Debates over the future centre on a single metric – that of GDP.

Gross domestic product was not always with us. Created in the 1930s, and despite the warnings of its pioneer, it rapidly assumed centre stage in economic policymaking.

Growth could now be measured targeted through policy. For the right, it would be a simple gauge of national economic virility. For the left, it offered the more subtle appeal of an end to disputes over the distribution of wealth.

By focusing not on the size of the slices, but on the size of the pie, an interminable conflict between capital and labour could seemingly be resolved. The case was put most forcefully in the Labour politician Anthony Crosland's influential book The Future of Socialism. Growth would deliver the public goods – secure employment and a functioning welfare state.

That consensus has now held for 50 years or more. Yet mounting evidence suggests that GDP growth does not register many of the things people actually care about. It is a record of some aspects of economic life, but it fails to capture wider social needs and demands. Health, quality of life and inequality play no part in its measurement.



Rising, falling GDP

There is a growing consensus that rising GDP since the mid-1970s in the US and the UK has become disconnected from reported measures of wellbeing. We know that falling GDP produces misery, as unemployment rises and incomes collapse. But the reverse does not apply. Higher output does not necessarily mean happier people.

Even growth's blunt promise of material prosperity is failing. GDP in the UK increased by 11% from 2003 to 2008. Over the same period, median real incomes stagnated. The economy boomed, but few shared in its rewards. Living standards were maintained through unsustainable debt. As we crawl back into recession, the majority will find those rewards still harder to come by – even if a minority continue to grow fat.

And environmental damage has no impact on GDP's progress. A few years of apparent prosperity can be bought at immense future cost. The tiny Pacific island of Nauru once enjoyed the highest per capita living standards of anywhere in the world. Its plentiful supplies of phosphate rock, in demand for fertiliser, had been strip-mined since the 1900s. But as the phosphate dwindled, so did incomes. Nauru has been reduced to providing a detention centre in return for Australian aid money.

Environmental limits can and will bite. From declining fish stocks to the overwhelming threat of climate change, there are physical limits to our economic activities. GDP registers none of this.

 Lessons from Japan

We need to change how we think about the economy. Japan has now laboured through nearly two decades of flatlining GDP. A miracle of growth transformed it from defeated power in 1945 to the world's second-largest economy. Then, in the 1990s, the growth stopped, never to convincingly return. Yet living standards in Japan are among the highest in the world. Unemployment is half that of the US; life expectancy five years longer. Average real incomes are the same as Germany's, and inequality lower. Japan's environmental impact, particularly through the import of raw materials, remains high. But it is not simply the economic basket case it is often presented as.

The old consensus needs breaking. We need to fixate less on growth alone.

The government recognises this much, aiming to create a national measure of wellbeing. But this accounting exercise is completely disconnected from economic practice. The coalition has a near-mystical belief in the power of the free market to deliver growth. It believes the national debt should be run down, clearing the way for a return to prosperity as the economy "rebalances". Purposeful government intervention is not needed.

The coalition's lack of success is a tribute to its lack of strategy. Rebalancing the economy away from debt-fuelled consumption and bloated financial services is a fine aim. It needs policies to match. Austerity does not just blight individual lives – Ireland has shown how it cripples whole economies as demand drains out of the system. So public spending, the bedrock of an economy in recession, must be held steady.

A genuine rebalancing, however, cannot come from maintaining status quo. The thinktank New Economics Foundation has begun an ambitious modelling exercise that seeks to show how a low-carbon economy can also deliver social justice.

Action, though, is needed now. Economic policy must be broadened towards meaningful goals – creating secure, well-paid jobs; minimising environmental damage. Where private investment is failing, with business expenditure sliding again last quarter, government should be prepared to step in.

A new industrial strategy could match social objectives with credible interventions, supporting the industries of the future. Or we will be left to chase a statistical chimera.