Economic Slowdown in developing nations

Emerging economies are being affected adversely by the European and US economic situations. 

DEVELOPING countries are increasingly being affected adversely by the economic recession in Europe and the slowdown in the United States.

The hope that major emerging economies like China, India and Brazil would continue to have robust growth, decoupling from Western economies and becoming an alternative engine of global growth, has been dashed by recent data showing that they are themselves weakening.

Just as during the 2008-2010 global crisis, a decline in exports caused by falling Western demand is the main way in which the developing countries are being hit.

Inflows of capital into developing countries have also slowed down, and a reversal to a new outflow situation may well take place. The lending conditions of banks in emerging economies have also deteriorated, according to a banking industry survey.

Recent reports confirm the slowdown in many major developing economies.

In China, growth of the gross domestic product fell to 7.6% in the second quarter of this year, denoting a continuous deceleration from 10.4% in 2010, 9.2% in 2011 and 8.1% in first-quarter 2012.

The IMF has lowered its growth projection for India to 6.1% for this year. This compares to 6.5% last year and 8.4% in the previous two years.

The Singapore economy contracted 1.1% in the second quarter over the previous quarter at an annualised rate, mainly due to manufacturing output falling by 6%.

For Malaysia, the growth rate for this year is projected to be 4.2% by the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research. This is lower than last year’s 5.1%, which had also slowed to 4.7% in the first quarter.

In Indonesia, the Central Bank said growth was slowing and projected this year’s rate to be 6.2%, compared with 6.5% last year (and 6.3% in the first quarter).

In South America, two of the largest economies are also facing decelerating growth prospects.

For Brazil, the government has lowered its growth projection for this year to 3% (from 4.5% earlier), but the IMF’s latest growth estimate is even lower at 2.5%. Growth last year was 2.7%; industrial production declined by 4.3% in the 12 months to May.

Argentina had one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Growth was 8.9% in 2011, and the average annual growth was 7.6% in 2003-2010.

But the economy contracted by 0.5% in the 12 months to May. Industrial production in June fell 4.4% on the year due mainly to a 31% decline in the auto sector.

In South Africa, growth in the first quarter was 2.7% over the previous quarter, which was down from the 3.2% growth of fourth-quarter 2011.

Last Friday, new World Bank President Jim Yong Kim warned that the debt crisis in Europe would hurt most regions in the world. He predicted that if a major European crisis developed, growth in developing countries could be cut by 4% or more.

Even if the eurozone crisis is contained, it could still reduce growth in most of the world’s regions by as much as 1.5%.

Also last week, the International Monetary Fund in its latest world economic outlook gave a downbeat picture of how developing countries were being affected adversely by the European and US economic situations.

It warned that the ability of governments worldwide to respond to the new slowdown had become limited. And while the withdrawal of capital from developing countries was not at critical levels, there could be problems for some if conditions deteriorated.

The prevailing view of prospects for developing economies has almost suddenly changed from their being emerging leaders of the global economy to being victims of the Western slowdown.

A paper by Yilmaz Akyuz, chief economist of the South Centre, shows that the theory of the “staggering rise of the South” had vastly exaggerated the developing countries’ decoupling from the economic fortunes or misfortunes of the developed countries.

Much of the high growth in developing countries in the past decade had been due to the favourable external conditions generated by Western countries.

High consumption growth in the US was a main basis for the high growth of manufactured exports from China and other East Asian countries, and these together enabled the boom in commodity prices that lifted growth in Africa and South America.

The boom in capital flows into major developing countries also helped to fuel their growth and covered the current deficits of several of them.

The 2008-09 global crisis slowed down developing countries’ export growth and reversed capital flows, but the strong anti-recession actions (fiscal stimulus, low interest rates and expansion of liquidity) in developed countries resulted in the resumption of export growth and capital inflows in developing countries.

However, with the developed countries ending their reflationary policies and switching to austerity budgets, with their low interest rates having little effect, recessionary conditions in Europe are now impacting adversely on developing countries.

With the positive conditions that supported the South’s rise no longer in place but instead turning negative, developing countries’ prospects have dimmed, prompting the need for a change in development strategy.

Meanwhile the Wall Street Journal of July 19 reported that lending conditions in emerging economies deteriorated in recent months due to the eurozone crisis.

According to a report of the Institute of International Finance, credit standards grew tighter in emerging-market banks around the world, while bad loans increased in the second quarter.

The results suggest trouble ahead for emerging economies, with banks in Asia and Latin America showing deeper caution, which can lead to weaker lending.

GLOBAL TRENDS 

By MARTIN KHOR newsdesk@thestar.com.my 

Financial Crisis: Calculating the Probability of Extreme Events

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ScienceDaily (Sep. 26, 2011) — It had to happen: the property bubble burst and the global financial market experienced its biggest crisis in the last hundred years. In retrospect, many suspected it was coming, but nobody could have known for sure. The traditional investment strategy failed, as all forms of investment suddenly collapsed at the same time. In order to calculate the probability of several such extreme events occurring at the same time, three scientists at the RUB have developed a new method. Prof. Dr. Holger Dette, Dr. Axel Bücher und Dr. Stanislav Volgushev from the Institute of Statistics (Faculty of Mathematics at the Ruhr-Universität) published their findings in the scientific journal The Annals of Statistics. 

Big things start small

Up to now, when statisticians estimated the probabilities of extreme events, they usually calculated with dependencies between the outliers of statistical series. The outliers, however, make up the smallest part of a data set, e.g. the largest 100 out of 3,600 data. That means they ignore the dependencies of the bulk of the relevant data set, namely 3,500 data, and thus take the risk that important information is lost. Axel Bücher shows how this problem can be solved: "Our work provides a decision aid as to whether it is better to use the full range of data and not only the outliers. If all the data are relevant, then they should all be included. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes these data would falsify the result."



Multidimensional function

The researchers use the copula function for the evaluation. "This is a complicated, multi-dimensional function, which characterises stochastic dependencies between the data" explains Stanislav Volgushev. With this aid, a few years ago we might have noticed that many little termites were nibbling their way into the wooden foundation of the global financial market, whilst we were on the look out for large predators.

Financial crises as motivation for research

"Our research is strongly motivated by the recent financial crises. At that time, almost all the economic models and forecasting tools for loan losses failed because they did not pay sufficient attention to extreme dependencies. In the long run, we aim to develop models and methods that predict such events better" says Prof. Dette, explaining the reason for their research. For several years, the three researchers have been looking into new methods of asymptotic statistics which work with sample sizes approaching infinity. They are financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the Collaborative Research Centre SFB 823 "Statistical modelling of nonlinear dynamic processes." The English-language publication bears the title "New estimators of the Pickands dependence function and a test for extreme-value dependence."

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European choice: Greek bailout Mark II – it’s a default !

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WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

The European debt crisis has evolved rather quickly since my last column, “Greece is Bankrupt” (July 2). The European leadership was clearly in denial. The crisis has lurched from one “scare” to another. First, it was Greece, then Ireland, then Portugal; and then back to Greece. On each occasion, European politicians muddled through, dithering to buy time with half-baked solutions: more “kicking the can down the road.” By last week, predictably, the crisis came home to roost. Financial markets in desperation turned on Italy, the euro-zone's third largest economy, with the biggest sovereign debt market in Europe. It has 1.9 trillion euros of sovereign debt outstanding (120% of its GDP), three times as much as Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined.

Over the next two weeks the EU must come up with a second Greek bailout which could be as high as £107billion on top of the £98billion in rescue loans agreed for Greece in May 

The situation has become just too serious, if contagion was allowed to fully play out. It was a reality check; a time to act as it threatened both European integration and the global recovery. So, on July 21, an emergency summit of European leaders of the 17-nation euro-currency area agreed to a second Greek bailout (Mark II), comprising two key elements: (i) the debt exchange (holders of 135 billion euros in Greek debt maturing up to 2020 will voluntarily accept new bonds of up to 15 to 30 years); and (ii) new loans of 109 billion euros (through its bailout fund and the IMF). Overall, Greek debt would fall by 26 billion euros from its total outstanding of 350 billion euros. No big deal really.

Contagion: Italy and Spain

By mid-July, the Greek debt drama had become a full-blown euro-zone crisis. Policy makers' efforts to insulate other countries from a Greek default, notably Italy and Spain, have failed. Markets panicked because of disenchantment over sloppy European policy making. For the first time, I think, investors became aware of the chains of contagion and are only now beginning to really think about them.

The situation in Italy is serious. At US$262bil, total sovereign claims by international banks on Italy exceeded their combined sovereign exposures to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which totalled US$226bil. European banks account for 90% of international banks' exposure to Italy and 84% of sovereign exposure, with French & German banks being the most exposed. Italy & Spain have together 6.3 trillion euros of public and private debt between them. Reflecting growing market unease, the yield on Italy's 10-year government bonds had risen to 5.6% on July 20, and Spain's, to 6%, against 2.76% on German comparable bunds, the widest spread ever in the euro era.

Italy and Spain face different challenges. Spain has a high budget deficit (9.2% of GDP in 2010, down from 11.1% in 2009) the target being to take it down to 6% in 2011 which assumes high implementation risks. Its debt to GDP ratio (at 64% in 2011) is lower than the average for the eurozone. The economy is only gradually recovering, led by exports. But Spain suffers from chronic unemployment (21%, with youth unemployment at 45%), weak productivity growth and a dysfunctional labour market.



It must also restructure its savings banks. Spain needs to continue with reforms; efforts to repair its economy are far from complete and risks remain considerable. Italy has a low budget deficit (4.6% of GDP) and hasn't had to prop-up its banks. But its economy has barely expanded in a decade, and its debt to GDP ratio of 119% in 2010 was second only to Greece. Italy suffers from sluggish growth, weak productivity and falling competitiveness. Its weaknesses reflect labour market rigidities and low efficiency. The main downside risk comes from turmoil in the eurozone periphery.

Another decade of stagnation also poses a major risk. But both Spain and Italy are not insolvent unlike Greece. The economies are not growing and need to be more competitive. The average maturity of their debt is a reasonable six to seven years. But the psychological damage already done to Europe's bond market cannot be readily undone.

The deal: Europeanisation of Greek debt 

The new bailout deal soughts to ring-fence Greece by declaring “Greece is in a uniquely grave situation in the eurozone. This is the reason why it requires an exceptional solution,” implying it's not to be repeated. Most don't believe it. But to its credit, the new deal cuts new ground in addition to bringing-in much needed extra cash - 109 billion euros, plus a contribution by private bondholders of up to 50 billion euros by mid-2014. For the first time, the new framework included solvent counterparties and adequate collateral. For investors, there is nothing like having Europe as the new counterparty instead of Greece. This europeanisation of the Greek debt lends some credibility to the programme. Other new features include: (i) reduction in interest rates to about 3.5% (4.5% to 5.8% now) and extension of maturities to 15 years (from 7 years), to be also offered to Ireland and Portugal; (ii) the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), its rescue vehicle, will be allowed to buy bonds in the secondary market, extend precautionary credit lines before States are shut-out of credit markets, and lend to help recapitalise banks; and (iii) buy collateral for use in the bond exchange, where investors are given four options to accept new bonds carrying differing risk profiles, worth less than their original holdings.

The IIF (Institute of International Finance), the industry trade group that negotiated for the banks, insurance funds and other investors, had estimated that one-half of the 135 billion euros to be exchanged will be for new bonds at 20% discount, giving a savings of 13.5 billion euros off the Greek debt load. Of the 109 billion euros from the new bailout (together with the IMF), 35 billion euros will be used to buy collateral to serve as insurance against the new bonds in exchange, while 20 billion euros will go to buy Greek debt at a discount in the secondary market and then retiring it, giving another savings of 12.6 billion euros on the Greek debt stock.

Impact of default

Once again, the evolving crisis was a step ahead of the politicians. There are fears that Italy and Spain could trip into double-dip recession as global growth falters, threatening the debt dynamics of both countries. This time the IMF weighed in with serious talk of contagion with widespread knock-on effects worldwide. Fear finally struck, forcing Germany and France to act, this time more seriously. The first reaction came from the credit rating agencies. Moody's downgraded Greece's rating three notches deeper into junk territory: to Ca, its second-lowest (from Caa1), short of a straight default. Similarly, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's have cut Greece's rating to CCC.

They have since downgraded it further. They are all expected to state Greece is in default when it begins to exchange its bonds in August for new, long-dated debt (up to 30 years) at a loss to investors (estimated at 21% of their bond holdings). The rating agencies would likely consider this debt exchange a “credit event”, but only for a limited period, I think. Greece's financial outlook thereafter will depend on whether the country would likely recover or default again. History is unkind: sovereigns that default often falters again.

What is also clear now is the new bailout would not do much to reduce Greece's huge stock of sovereign debt. At best, the fall in its debt stock will represent 12% of Greece's GDP. Over the medium term, Greece continues to face solvency challenges. Its stock of debt will still be well in excess of 130% of GDP and will face significant implementation risks to financial and economic reform. No doubt the latest bailout benefitted the entire eurozone by containing near-term contagion risks, which otherwise would engulf Europe. It did manage to provide for the time being, some confidence to investors in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy that it's not going to be a downward spiral. But the latest wave of post-bailout warnings have reignited concerns of contagion risks and revived investor caution.

Still, the bailout doesn't address the very core fiscal problems across the eurozone. This is not a comprehensive solution. It shifted additional risks towards contributing members with stronger finances and their taxpayers as well as private investors, and reduces incentives for governments to keep their fiscal affairs under strict check. This worries the Germans as it weakens the foundation of currency union based on fiscal self-discipline. Moreover, the EFSF now given more authority to intervene pre-emptively before a state gets bankrupt, didn't get more funds.

German backlash appears to be also growing. While the market appears to be moving beyond solvency to looking at potential threat to the eurozone as a whole, the elements needed to fight systemic failure are not present. At best, the deal reflected a courageous effort but fell short of addressing underlying issues, leading to fears that Greece-like crisis situations could still flare-up, spreading this time deep into the eurozone's core.

Growing pains

The excitement of the bailout blanked out an even bigger challenge that could further destabilise the eurozone sluggish growth. The July Markit Purchasing Managers Index came in at 50.8, the lowest since August 2009 and close enough to the 50 mark that divides expansion from contraction. And, way below the consensus forecast. Both manufacturing and services slackened. Germany and France expanded at the slowest pace in two years in the face of a eurozone that's displaying signs it is already contracting. Looking ahead, earlier expectations of a 2H'11 pick-up now remains doubtful.Lower GDP growth will require fiscal stimulus to fix, at a time of growing fiscal consolidation which threatens a downward spiral. At this time, the eurozone needs policies to restart growth, especially around the periphery. Without growth, economic reform and budget restraints only exacerbate political backlash and social tensions. This makes it near impossible to restore debt sustainability. Germany may have to delay its austerity programme without becoming a fiscal drag. This trade-off between growth and austerity is real.

IMF studies show that cutting a country's budget deficit by 3% points of GDP would reduce real output growth by two percentage points and raise the unemployment rate by one percentage point. History suggests growth and austerity just do not mix. In practical terms, it is harder for politicians to stimulate growth than cut debt.

Reform takes time to yield results. And, markets are fickle. In the event the market switches focus from high-debt to low-growth economies, a crisis can easily evolve to enter a new phase one that could help businesses invest and employ rather than a pre-mature swing of the fiscal axe. Timing is critical. It now appears timely for the United States and Europe to shift priorities. They can't just wait forever to rein in their debts. Sure, they need credible plans over the medium term for deficit reduction. More austerity now won't get growth going. The surest way to build confidence is to get recovery onto a sustainable path only growth can do that. Without it, the risk of a double-dip recession increases. Latest warnings from the financial markets in Europe and Wall Street send the same message: get your acts together and grow. This needs statesmanship. The status quo is just not good enough anymore.

Former banker Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British chartered scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.